the backup software) has permissions to read and write. Permissions – Cloud object storage also permits restrictive permissions to be set so only a very specific user ID (e.g. To put it simply, in air-gapped storage, you prevent hackers from accessing your backup data by creating a secondary backup in an offline location cut off from.Warning mechanisms – Cloud object storage systems also have ways to detect en masse operations like a large number of file deletions – which is typical of ransomware – and issue warnings.This is almost the same as the “flip ON” and “flip OFF” storage approaches. It will remove the access token used for the backup or restore session once completed, thwarting any possibility of an extraneous agent using the token for illegitimate use. Small Access Window – Good backup software will preserve the connection to object storage for only the time required to complete the backup or restore operation. ![]() This is a change in protocol that ransomware can’t easily negotiate. Protocol change – Local data backups from the data source to the backup servers may make their way over a LAN in the form of ethernet packets, but when writing to object storage, the data is most likely written over HTTPS using REST APIs.This access still has to be carefully controlled since USB drive may have vulnerabilities (see below). In fact, object storage targets are one of the few types of data repositories that have remained immune from ransomware attacks. One way to transfer data between the outside world and the air-gapped system is to copy data on a removable storage medium such as a removable disk or USB flash drive and physically carry the storage to the other system. Thus, with the tape cartridge not connected to the system, you have an air-gapped backup and attackers cannot get hold of data and corrupt it. There are much easier targets for ransomware authors to go after. Tape backups are stored offline, meaning that the tape storage device gets disconnected from the system once the backup operation is complete. ![]() No ransomware variants have been found that authenticate themselves to object storage targets – for the simple reason that it is hard to do so. These tokens also have limited validity periods – and need to be refreshed by the backup software by re-identifying themselves repeatedly as valid users of such a token. The backup software needs to have authenticated using a secure, modern protocol such as OAUTH 2.0 and received a token. ![]() With no direct link from the outside world, they are safe from being overwritten, corrupted or unauthorised access. Authentication – Most object storage targets don’t just let programs write data to them like they are a mounted SAN/NAS drive. Air gaps offer an additional layer of security by taking your backups offline.
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